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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Bruce Dolfman, administrator of the estate of Li Zhen, appeals the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Cedar Fair and Camp Counselors 
U.S.A. The District Court dismissed Dolfman’s negligence claims because Dolfman 
could not prove that the defendants breached their duties of care or that their actions 
proximately caused Li Zhen’s death. Because we agree that there is no proximate cause, 
we will affirm. 
I. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 
to our analysis. 
Li Zhen was a twenty-two-year-old student from Tianjin, China, a city of over 
eight million people. She had traveled internationally on several occasions and regularly 
navigated busy streets. She entered the United States on a J-1 Visa under the Summer 
Work and Travel Program, which “provide[s] foreign college and university students 
with opportunities to interact with U.S. citizens, experience U.S. culture while sharing 
their own cultures with Americans they meet, travel in the United States, and work in 
jobs that require minimal training and are seasonal or temporary in order to earn funds to 
help defray a portion of their expenses.”1 Li Zhen’s participation in the program was 
administered by Camp Counselors U.S.A. (“CCUSA”), a program sponsor that matches 
prospective participants with employers in the United States, and Cedar Fair, which 
operates Dorney Park & Wildwater Kingdom in Allentown, Pennsylvania.  
Li Zhen was a fast food worker at Dorney Park during the summer of 2012. From 
June until August 13th, Li Zhen lived in dormitory housing at Cedar Crest College, as 
was required by Cedar Fair. After August 13, 2012, Li Zhen resided at the Comfort Suites 
Hotel in Allentown. The hotel is located on Hamilton Boulevard directly across from 
Dorney Park. Hamilton Boulevard is a busy, four-lane, two-way road with a median strip 
and is accessible to Interstate 78 via on and off ramps. Several modes of transportation 
                                              
1 22 C.F.R. § 62.32(b). 
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from the hotel were available, including a Dorney Park shuttle; a local bus service, which 
stopped in front of the hotel; the regional Beiber Bus, which had a terminal three quarters 
of a mile from the hotel; a courtesy van provided by the Comfort Suites; and local taxi 
services. 
On September 4, 2012, Li Zhen left her hotel on foot before sunrise at 5:30 am. 
She and her friends had planned a personal trip to Philadelphia, which required Li Zhen 
to walk to the terminal for the Beiber Bus. In order to get to the Beiber Bus terminal, two 
routes were available to Li Zhen: one required Li Zhen to walk through residential areas 
behind the Comfort Suites. This route was much longer than the alternative route—to 
walk along Hamilton Boulevard and then to cross the onramp to Interstate 78.  
Li Zhen chose the shorter route and walked west along Hamilton Boulevard. 
When she approached the onramp to Interstate 78 and began to cross, she was struck by a 
Jeep driven by Zachary Edwards. Edwards was nineteen years old and driving to a jobsite 
for his employer, R.J. Skelding Co. He held a valid Pennsylvania driver’s license at the 
time of the accident but was operating his vehicle illegally because his license restricted 
him to “daylight only” driving due to retinoschisis—a genetic eye disorder. The accident 
occurred before dawn. Edwards testified that he saw Li Zhen on the ramp, and although 
he veered to avoid her, Li Zhen also veered in the same direction. Li Zhen died a short 
time after the accident. 
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The plaintiff, Bruce Dolfman, is the administrator of Li Zhen’s estate. He filed suit 
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging state law negligence claims against 
defendants Cedar Fair, CCUSA, R.J. Skelding Co., and Zachary Edwards.  
Cedar Fair, CCUSA, and R.J. Skelding moved for summary judgment on all of 
Dolfman’s claims. The District Court granted Cedar Fair’s and CCUSA’s motions on 
November 21, 2014, but denied R.J. Skelding’s motion. After Cedar Fair and CCUSA 
were dismissed from the litigation, Dolfman settled his claims with R.J. Skelding and 
Edwards. Following the dismissal with prejudice, Dolfman timely appealed the order 
granting summary judgment to Cedar Fair and CCUSA. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary judgment, 
viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and applying the same 
standard that guides our district courts.”2 Summary judgment is proper where “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”3 
III. 
In order to make out a claim for negligence in Pennsylvania, Dolfman must show: 
the defendants had a duty of care to Li Zhen, they breached that duty, there is a causal 
                                              
2 Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). 
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
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connection between their conduct and the resulting injury, and Li Zhen suffered actual 
loss or damage.4 Dolfman argues that summary judgment was improper as to both (1) 
Cedar Fair and (2) CCUSA. 
1. 
Dolfman first argues that Cedar Fair was negligent in placing Li Zhen at the 
Comfort Suites Hotel, which is located on a dangerous road. According to Dolfman, 
Cedar Fair knew that its employees would be required to walk along the road, putting 
them in danger. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Cedar Fair 
because it held that, as a matter of law, there was no proximate cause—any hypothetical 
breach of duty on Cedar Fair’s part was not the proximate cause of Li Zhen’s death.5 
Dolfman argues that this was error. 
Under Pennsylvania law, proximate cause exists where the alleged wrongful act 
was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm. “[A] substantial factor 
need not be … the only factor in bringing about the relevant harm.”6 Rather, in 
determining whether proximate cause exists, we examine: (1) the number of other factors 
which contribute to produce the harm and the extent they have in producing it; (2) 
whether the actor’s conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in 
                                              
4 Farabaugh v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 911 A.2d 1264, 1272-73 (Pa. 2006). 
5 The District Court also held that neither Cedar Fair nor CCUSA had breached 
their duties of care to Li Zhen. Because we hold that the District Court was correct in 
finding there is no proximate cause as to either defendant, we do not address the District 
Court’s holding concerning the breach of duty. 
6 Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 772 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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continuous and active operation up to the time of the harm, or has created a situation 
harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not responsible; and (3) 
lapse of time.7  
The District Court was correct in holding that any alleged breach of duty by Cedar 
Fair did not proximately cause Li Zhen’s death. There are simply too many other factors 
that contributed to her death to a far greater extent than her placement at the Comfort 
Suites Hotel. First, Zachary Edwards drove in violation of his license restrictions and 
ultimately struck Li Zhen. Second, Li Zhen chose to make a personal trip to Philadelphia 
and left early in the morning before dawn. Finally, she chose not to avail herself of the 
other available modes of transportation or take a different route to the bus stop. Li Zhen’s 
placement at the Comfort Suites was thus a situation harmless unless acted upon by other 
forces for which Cedar Fair is not responsible.  
Dolfman contends that his expert reports preclude the District Court from holding 
that there was no proximate cause. Dolfman’s experts testified that placing Li Zhen at the 
Comfort Suites and failing to safeguard her health, safety, and welfare “were substantial 
contributing factors to the death of Li Zhen.”8 However, “an expert witness is prohibited 
from rendering a legal opinion.”9 Proximate cause is a question of law for the court to 
                                              
7 Am. Truck Leasing, Inc. v. Thorne Equip. Co., 583 A.2d 1242, 1243 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1991) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433). 
8 App. at 316-330a. 
9 Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 217 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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answer.10 Thus, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of 
Cedar Fair. 
2. 
In challenging the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in CCUSA’s favor, 
Dolfman offers two ways in which CCUSA breached its duty of care and those breaches 
proximately caused Li Zhen’s death. First, he argues that CCUSA’s acquiescence to 
Cedar Fair’s placement of Li Zhen at the Comfort Suites proximately caused her death; 
and second, he argues that CCUSA failed to orient Li Zhen, in violation of its duty under 
federal regulations, and that failure proximately caused her death. The District Court held 
that any alleged breach—either the acquiescence to Cedar Fair’s housing choice or the 
failure to orient—by CCUSA did not proximately cause her death.  
For the same reasons that summary judgment was proper with respect to Cedar 
Fair, summary judgment was also proper in favor of CCUSA. Cedar Fair’s placing Li 
Zhen at the Comfort Suites Hotel was not a substantial factor in causing her death, and 
therefore, CCUSA’s acquiescence to that decision also is not a substantial factor in her 
death.  
With respect to Dolfman’s second argument, unlike Cedar Fair, CCUSA, as 
program sponsor, had a duty to orient Li Zhen.11 But even assuming CCUSA breached its 
                                              
10 Holt v. Navarro, 932 A.2d 915, 921 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 
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duty by not orienting Li Zhen to traffic laws and pedestrian safety, that hypothetical 
breach was not the proximate cause of her death. It is too attenuated to constitute a 
substantial factor. Instead, too many other factors contributed to a greater extent to her 
accident. In addition, Li Zhen’s background and extensive experience in traveling 
demonstrate that she did not need to be informed about the risks of crossing the street. 
Because any alleged breach by CCUSA did not proximately cause Li Zhen’s death, the 
District Court was correct in granting summary judgment in CCUSA’s favor. 
V. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Cedar Fair and CCUSA.  
                                                                                                                                                  
11 22 C.F.R. § 62.10 (requiring the program sponsor to provide orientation to 
participants before they arrive) & § 62.32 (requiring the program sponsor, “in those 
instances when the employer provides housing or transportation,” to place participants 
only with host employers who “agree to provide suitable and acceptable accommodations 
and/or reliable, affordable, and convenient transportation”). 
